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RADICAL PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THEORY: 
EXAMINATION AND DEFENSE1 
by 
Kai Nielsen 
The real social function of philosophy lies in its criticism of 
what is prevalent. That does not mean superficial fault-finding 
with individual ideas or conditions, as though a philosopher 
were a crank. Nor does it mean that the philosopher complains 
about this or that isolated condition and suggests remedies. 'The 
chief aim of such criticism is to prevent mankind from losing 
itself in those ·ideas and activities which the existing organiza· 
tion of society instills into its members. Man must be made to 
see the relationship between his activities and what is achieved 
thereby, between his particular existence and the general life of 
society, between his everyday projects and the great ideas 
which he acknowledges. Philosophy exposes the contradiction 
in which man is entangled insofar as he mus.t attach himself to 
isolated ideas and concepts in everyday life. My point can easily 
be seen from the following. The aim of western philosophy in 
its first complete form, in Plato, was to cancel and negate one­
sidedness in a more comprehensive system of thought, in a sys­
tem more flexible and better adapted to reality. 
Max Horkheimer 
I 
In 1972 a group of young philosophers in England, largely in reaction to the 
way philosophy was practiced in the Anglo-Saxon world in general and in England 
in particular, formed a group of loosely affiliated philosophers called the Radical 
Philosophy Group and began the publication of a new and exciting journal 
dubbed by them Radical Philosophy. Like the logical positivists in their forma­
tive period, they put forth a number of manifestos and programmatic essays 
which both made clear what it is they were reacting against and something of 
where they wanted to go.2 The Radical Philosophy Group is no more unified a 
group either politically or philosophically than were the logical positivist;.<;, but 
in both instances there are distinctive philosophical commitments which help de­
fine them. I shall set out what these are for the Radical Philosophy Group and, 
initially and briefly, relate this movement to the older radical school of Critical 
Theory coming out of Frankfurt. a I should say at the outset, however, that I am 
not simply engaging i!l an exercise in intellectual history. I feel quite comfortable 
with such ideas myself and I shall, after my initial general characterization, move, 
formulating matters in my own way, to argument and defense. 
8 1  
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I shall in this preamble only add something to which some of my radical col­
leagues would not so readily assent, namely that I see no conflict at all between 
being a radical philosopher and being, what used to be called, an analytic phil­
osopher. Indeed, I share J.L. Mackie's view that, while "conceptual analysis is not 
the whole of philosophy," all good philosophy "must be analytic," meaning by 
that nothing more controversial or portentous than what Mackies does, namely 
a) that attention is paid to the meanings of the key terms used and the logical 
status of one's remarks, b )  that the theses set forth are formulated ''precisely 
enough to allow them to be fairly examined and tested," c) that reasonable al­
ternative possibilities are carefully considered, and d) that there is a critical re­
flection to one's own procedures.4 I should hope to persuade my radical col· 
leagues jaundiced by the posturing and superficiality of much analytic philosophy 
that these are virtues in any philosopher. 
There is a way of trivializing a discussion of radical philosophy which I would 
like to confront at the outset. It is to say that to talk about radical philosophy 
Is simply to talk about Marxism. This is false as far as the intellectual commit­
ments of the Radical Philosophy Group are concerned. Some are Marxists, some 
are not and some are simply people such as myself who may be on their way --per­
haps in ten year's time--to being Marxists. Moreover, even those who are Marxists 
do not characterize radical philosophy in such a way that to be a radical philoso­
pher is to be a Marxist. There is a common recognition among the group o f  the 
importance of Marx and an understanding of the need to come to grips with him 
in a way that philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon tradition have not commonly 
done. But such a recognition of the really vital need to understand Marx is an­
other matter altogether from the claim that to be radical philosophers we must 
be Marxists. 
This discussion is trivialized, if it takes that turn, for we are on well-trodden 
ground if the discussion revolves around whether a) philosophy or b) at least 
good philosophy should be or even must be Marxist. Perhaps it should, but there 
are endless questions here and indeed assumptions which would first have to be 
reasoned out and resolved, not the least of which would involve a rather more 
complet.e understanding of what Marx was all about than most of us have. For 
these reasons, this discussion of radical philosophy shall not be about the viability 
of Marxism. 
We should also keep in mind that, unless we persuasively re-define 'radical 
philosopher' in a partisan and dogmatic way, there are radical philosophers with 
overriding radical philosophical outlooks who are not Marxists. The Critical 
Theorists of the Frankfurt school are key examples, Jurgen Habermas being per· 
haps the most striking case. He is indeed what Ryle would call a Teutonic camel 
who has developed a grandiose, very Germanic overall philosophical view, which 
tries, in addition to the Marxist tradition, to integrate into a coherent whole some 
of the philosophically relevant work being done in linguistics and many of Wittgen­
stein's, Pierce's,and Freud's key conceptions.Whilerespectful of and buildingon 
Marx,Habermas is extensively critical of Marx. Indeed, Habermas rejects certain of 
Marx's key conceptions and beliefs. And while it may very well be, as Goran 
82 
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Therbom has powerfully argued, that Habermas' account is no improvement on 
Marx's and that, in his ponderously obscure Germanic Manner, Habermas has 
unwittingly done a disservice to radical philosophy, this is by no means obvious. 5 
In this essay I shall not take sides on this matter. Indeed, 'taking sides' is irrele­
vant to my present point, for it is clear enough that Habermas' account is a) a 
totalistic one and b) a radical account. Similar things could be said for the rest of 
the Frankfurt school. Orthodox Marxist accounts may be superior, but whether 
or not that is so, it is the case that the Frankfurt Critical Theorists all have 
socialist commitments and they all philosophize with an emancipatory interest. 
It is not the case that Marxism is the only totalizing radical theory and it is not 
the case that those radical philosophers who are not Marxists are without any 
general theory of the social reality they wish to describe. 
However, in gaining a sense of what radical philosophy is all about and some­
thing of its range, it is important to see how these Critical Theorists differed 
from Marx. Habermas and Wellmer, for example, criticize Marx for his objec­
tivism and latent positivism, for his overly mechanistic view of the relation of 
base to superstructure and for generally underestimating the power of ideology. 
Mars, on Habermas' view, too easily assumes class consciousness will emerge 
from changed economic conditions and that with those altered economic con­
ditions the proletarian revolution will inevitably occur. The ideological devices 
for human domination are far stronger than Marx realized and the causes of 
human misery, alienation and false consciousness are not as narrowly economic 
as Marx gives us to understand. Habermas, and his American disciole, Trent 
Schroyer, both take it as a crucial axiom of their Critical Theory--an axiom 
which sets it apart from OrthodoX"Marxism--that "the scientistic image of science 
is the fundamental false consciousness of.our epoch."6 This scientistic ideology, 
finding its purest philosophical expression in positivism, mediates and partially 
defeldts the structural conflicts between capital and labour. " Alienation of 
human activity," Schroyer remarks, "is now not directly expressible as the 
appropriation of surplus value, but is more accurately conceptualized as the re­
pressive results of instrumental rationalization. "7 It is a central feature of the 
scientistic ideology of our time to have a very narrow economic conception of 
rationality--a conception held in common by such very different philosophers, 
with such very different conceptions about ethics and social philosophy, as 
Russell and Rawls. It is the view of Habermas and Wellmer that it is not just the 
relations of production which are fetters bu't the whole technical and technolog­
ical complex in which they are embedded with the appropriate persuasively de· 
fined conception of rationality. 
It is true that, like Marx, Habermas contends that emancipation from coercive 
and repressive institutions depends upon the extent to which the processes of 
nature can be technically controlled. He even goes so far as to argue that the very 
form in which actual moral and political problems are posed depends on the 
technical context in which they arise. Yet, Habermas believes as well, and this 
sets him (or at least seems to set him) apart from Marx, that institutions and in­
stitutions and indeed society itself can only be changed by self-reflection sys­
tematically pursued and scientifically refined. Here we have in his account Freud 
83 
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supplementing and perhaps contradicting Marx and we have, as well, a richer 
notion of rationality than the dominant conception of economic rationality. 
The need for self-reflective knowledge in addition to purely instrumental know­
ledge emerges from the fact (putative fact) that there is no direct way to control 
the adaptations we make to make nature meet our needs so that our practical 
adaptations will be reflective (reasonable) and controlled. There is no direct way 
to such control because institutions, like symptoms, are compromises between 
defense and gratification. 
Whatever the comparative merits of Marxism versus Critical Theory (some­
thing I shall not try to sort out here), it is important to note that radical 
philosophers in England have tended to go their own way, profiting from Crit­
ical Theorists and from Marx and Marxists on the way, but hardly developing 
that ponderous and often obscure Continental manner, and not coming to any 
set identification with the doctrinal commitments of either Orthodox Marxists 
or Critical Theory. 
This is not to say, however, that there is nothing distinctive about these di­
verse philosophers in virtue of which we can fittingly call all of them 'radical 
philosophers.• What stands out as a common core of agreement among all radical 
philosophers is the conviction that our capitalist society needs a radical trans­
formation into a genuinely socialist society. The qualifier is cruciaJ, for some 
societies which have thought of themselves as socialist societies have exhibited 
only a necessary condition for the attainment of socialism. That is to say, be­
sides social ownership of the means of production we must also have pro­
duction geared to satisfy the real needs of the masses of people and we must 
have as well a worker's democracy, where the workers actually have clear con­
trol of their own social environment. 
A radical philosopher takes such convictions and the social intent built into 
them as providing a key underlying rationale for much of his philosophizing. As 
a philosopher, he will, of course, be concerned to clarify and perspicuously dis­
play and integrate his key concepts and beliefs relevant to such a view of man 
and society and he will, moreover, be concerned to provide them with a system­
atic and coherent elaboration. He will strive to provide an elucidation of his key 
concepts which will free them from charges of incoherence and stultifying vague­
ness and he will be concerned to set them out in such a way that his claims are 
clear enough to be assessable and· indeed (where they are empirical) clearly 
confirmable or disconfirmable. 
To take an illustration, Ralf Dahrendorf, a perceptive liberal social theorist 
and now director of the London School of Economics, has argued that the 
socialist ideal of classlessness is incoherent.� No society, he argues, could pos­
sibly be classless. A radical philosopher, in the face of such a criticism, will 
attempt to give an account of classlessness which a) frees it from the charge of 
incoherence so that we can see how it could have an application , b) he or she 
will try to state it in such a way that it is clear under what conditions (pace 
Rawls] it correctly could be said classlessness was attainable, and c) by norma­
tive argument such a radical would attempt to make plain why such a state of 
84 
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affairs [pace Isaiah Berlin] is desirable.9 
Generally such a person would do similar conceptual things with many of 
the elements of a socialist statement of principle such as the one I made above 
and, of course, a radical philosopher would extend it to many other such notions. 
We very much need to get clear or at least clearer about such·· · concep­
tions as 'workees democracy., 'social ownership of the means of production,' 
'worker's control,' 'class conflict,' 'historical materialism,' 'revolution,' 'truly 
human society,' 'ideology,' 'false consciousness,' 'proletariat' and the like. We 
need to elucidate them in the piecemeal way we have learned from the analytic 
tradition and we need systematically to interrelate them in a manner similar to 
the way Strawson, Hampshire, Rawls and Hart have done in other domains. It 
is the social intent and the set of distinct moral and factual beliefs about the 
world which primarily distinguishes radical philosophers--or at least the kind of 
radical philosopher I take myself and many others in the Radical Philosophy 
Group to be--from their non-radical establishment predecessors or colleagues.10 
The stress on social intent should not be understood merely (though it is 
that as well) as an interest in social phenomena (many non-radicals share that in­
terest) but also as a commitment to the achievement of a socialist world order, 
though like any other rational commitment it must be open to criticism and 
assessment such that it would not be held no matter what evidential, moral and 




I strongly suspect, a radical philosopher's non-radical colleagues will remark 
(or at least think) the radical philosopher is unlike us and like a Christian phil­
osopher (keeping in mind that not all Christians who happen to be philosophers 
must be Christian philosophers) in that he or she starts with a social-moral com­
mitment and taking that as given he or she engages in conceptual analysis simply 
to try to make that antecedent commitment more palatable to the sceptic, yet-· 
it will be thought--a radical philosopher is not prepared to critically inspect his 
own ideology or to abandon it in the light of philosophical argument. Such a 
philosopher is in no way a neutral analyst, and in that partisan commitment he 
or she is decidedly unphilosophical and perhaps is even guilty of a certain lapse 
of reasonableness. 
I am anything but confident that this criticism applies to all Christian phil­
osophers--consider Basil Mitchell, Ian Crombie or Michael Durrant for example-· 
but it certainly does not apply to radical philosophers, though it may well apply 
to certain socialist hacks. A radical philosopher (indeed I hope radicals generally) 
will very much want to know whether his vision of the world is true or indeed 
sometimes( depending on exactly what his own philosophical conceptions are) 
whether the commitments integral to that vision are even the sort of things 
which could be true or false. He will, as a rational individual, want to subject 
his beliefs and claims to as severe tests as possible, though he may--through 
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scepticism about scientism--be sceptical about doing it in a Popperian manner.1 1  
But he will see the need for test and assessment and as a philosopher he will be 
concerned to set out his account in such a way that it can be assessed. Indeed 
his radicalism will make him doubly sensitive about the ways ideological con­
ceptions function in our lives and he will be concerned to purge his account of 
any ideological irrational residues. 1 2  Moreover, given a careful factual norma­
tive and conceptual examination-I do not imply these can be separated off 
into airtight compartments--if it is shown to him that his socia1ist commitments 
are in error he will abandon them. He will, no more than will a reasonable 
scientist, conservative, shaman or Christian, abandon his overall framework be­
cause of a few unresolved difficulties, but if the weight of the evidential, rational 
and moral considerations cut against him and indeed do so as clearly as we can 
reasonably expect over such large issues, such a radica1 will abandon his or her 
radicalism. Such a person surely will not hold on to socialist commitments come 
what may. (I should remark here parenthetica1ly that we should beware of 
postures about neutrality. People are seldom neutral about fundamental issues, 
and more importantly still, to be objective is not necessarily to be neutral. It is 
objectivity and a respect for truth that is important not neutrality. We should 
take to heart in this context C. Wright Mill's remarks about his won study of the 
Marxists: "I have tried to be objective, I do not claim to be detached.") 
111 
There is a further point to be stressed here that may lead us into deeper 
waters. Radical philosophers are more liberal than most of their colleagues over 
what they will allow the term 'philosophy' to range over; most particularly they 
are not concerned to limit philosophy to conceptual or linguistic analysis. In­
deed they expressly and pointedly foreswear any such limitation and are very 
unconcerned about drawing boundaries between the different disciplines. They 
are for impurity in philosophy in a way that would shock an Austinian, Wittgen­
steinian or a logical empiricist.13 There is little concern to ask if  a given remark 
is a grammatical remark or if a given question is empirical, normative or concep­
tual. They (or I should say 'we' for I am exactly of this persuasion) are concerned 
to relate philosophical investigations to a general critical theory of society in 
which work in economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology (particularly 
social psychology) and history is closely related to philosophical work. Typic­
ally, non-radical philosophy with a kind of Cartesian penchant--sometimes wit;. 
tingly 
•• sometimes unwittingly--finds its non-philosophical model or at least 
intellectual associates in mathematics, theoretical physics or more recently in 
theoretical linguistics. There in the austerity of those disciplines, we have some­
thing highly formal, seemingly more certain and freer from the winds of doc­
trine, change and the distortions of ideology than anything we can attain in most 
domains. But we also have, something very abstract which tells us very little about 
man and society. Radical. philosophy and critical theory with its interest in un­
derstanding society, with its interest in understanding such phenomena as cap­
italism and (more generally) changing social forms--together with some very con­
siderable interest in questions about the possible limits and development of 
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social forms--will tam its interest away from mathematical disciplines and tum 
its interest away from mathematical disciplines and tum to what any philos­
ophers (perhaps quite rightly see as the murky waters of social and historical 
studies. 14 We radicals will try to take Hegel and Collingwood 's injunctions 
seriously and will seek to make our philosophizing come to grips with history 
in some fruitful way so that we can understand human and conceptual change 
and develop categories to clearly and helpfully display this change rather than 
persistently viewing things synchronically and ahistorically, e.g. Plato and Ryle 
disputing about what is knowledge. We will be far more interested in asking 
questions about what are the social detuminates of truth, what is the nature of 
authority, what (if anything) constitutes development or progress (as distinct 
from change) and what (if anything) constitutes emancipation, than we will be 
concerned to ask what is it for something to be a cause, what is entailment, are 
there unsensed sense-data or is self-deception possible? We will be far more 
interested in linking philosophy firmly with the social sciences and we would 
de-emphasize philosophy's formal an� purely autonomous sides. A philosophy 
curriculum structured by radical philosophers would have much more Kant, 
Hegel and Marx and a less exclusive study of Descartes and Leibniz and the trip 
through Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Philosophy graduates students would do 
less logic and philosophy of language and would link their epistemological 
studies more closely with social studies. Philosophy Ph.D. 's. would once again 
know Adam Smith, Ricardo and Marx and core contemporary social theorists 
such as Durkheim, Weber, Pareto, Keynes, Lukacs and Freud. This would not be 
merely the specialized knowledge of a few people with a specialist's interest, but 
would be part of the core of their studies, while study of deontic logic, modal 
logic or transformational grammar would be work for people with a certain 
specialist's bent. Finally, modelled somewhat after the work done by George 
Lukacs and Lucian Goldmann, philosophy would be related more carefully to 
literary and historical studies. Philosophers would once again be intellectuals-­
albeit intellectuals with distinctive interest in concepts--rather than narrowly 
specialized professionals who indeed in the more unfortunate cases are 
Fachidioten. 
IV 
Radical philosophy shou!ld be understood both in terms of what it is a reaction 
against and in terms of what positive claims of a tolerably distinctive sort it 
makes itself. We have already seen something of the latter in my general char­
acterization of radical philosophy, but I shall here extend this and put it explic­
itly in terms of the commitments of the Radical Philosophy Group. 'There is no 
sharp distinction between their reactive claims and their positive claims, but 
drawing that distinction is, I believe, a useful methodological device. I shall be­
gin by simply listing (1 · 10) certain of their positive claims, postures and com­
mitments (procedural and otherwise) and then in ( 1 1-17) I shall state their neg­
ative and reactive claims. That task done, I shall in the following sections com­
ment on these claims. 
(1-10) 1. Thete is a concern to philosophize in such a way that phil­
osophy will have some rational human use. 'There is a rejec-
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tion of the view., current among most non-radical philos­
ophers, that philosophy itself needs no justification. 
2. Philosophy should be practiced in such a way that i t  is rele­
vant to people's lives and interests. The aim is for philosophy 
to help give people some understanding of their lives and an 
enhanced awareness of how society works and the options 
open to them. In fine, philosophy is to have an emancipa-
!Q!y interest and this does not come down to simply helping 
people to have clearer heads. 
3. In practicing philosophy and indeed, as p.art of our practice, 
in teaching philosophy, we should philosophizewith a goal, 
namely with the goal of educating for a new social order. We 
need to grapple with the problems raised by the theory and 
practice of social change. The task is to play a significant. 
role, along with other disciplines, as an accelerator of social 
change.1 5  Philosophy should function as a weapon of crit­
ism in an attempt to raise consciousness--a consciousness 
which will see the need for and the possibility of a socialist 
future. 
4. In our philosophical work we must endeavour to "make co­
herent the principles and problems raised by the masses i.n 
their practical activity." We must take as our philosophical 
touchstone the actual problems of human beings and not 
simply the problems of philosophers.1 6  
5. The teaching o f  philosophy should be taken to be of cru­
cial importance to us and not to be a kind of ancillary activ­
ity. We need to excite the non-specialist by helping to 
"make sense of his world" and we need to give him "some· 
thing to live by." 
6. We must try to capture and perspicuously display the always 
implicit and often unrecognized presuppositions which are 
at the base of the conceptual schemes which play the most 
pervasive role in organizing our experience. 
7. We need to do philosophy not j4st in a piecemeal way but 
we must also make an attempt to gain a comprehensive and 
systematic view of reality, especially of human reality. 
8. We need to work out in some careful fashion how philo· 
sophy is grounded or at lease partially grounded in 'view­
points' or. whatever they would be better called and of how, 
given this, philosophy differs from ideology pure and 
simple. "1 7 We need in this connection to come to grips with 
the ideological role of philosophy. 
9. We need to overcome the 'disrelation' between our polit­
ical convictions and our philosophical work. What is cru­
cial to see is that while philosophy cannot be reduced to 
social and political practice--it is more general, systematic 
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and raises questions about underlying presuppositions-that 
all the same philosophy and social practice form an essen· 
tial unity. Philosophies arise out of, and describe and (wit­
tingly or unwittingly) serve to justify certain ways of life. 
"Philosophy is, in Lhis way, social and ultimately political 
in nature; it is, in this sense, ideology; and particular· phil­
osophies a.re revealed as such with the passing of historical 
ti ,,18 me. 
10.Philosophy has been and must, of course, continue to be a 
discipline which, without making a fetish of either, is rigor­
ous and demanding, proceeding by argument and by analy­
sis; but at the same time it needs to provide a systematic 
and comprehensive overview which can have relevance or 
interest to the vast mass of people. Contemporary radical 
philosophers would whole-heartedly subscribe to Paul 
Nizan 's remark that while "the great anonymous mass of 
human beings ... undoubtedly have a real need for a philos­
ophy ... that is, for a consistent world-view and a body of 
guiding principles and clearly defined aims--this mass is ef­
fectively deprived by the boui:geoisie of any ideological mat­
erial which might prove relevant to their existence.19 
The above ten propositions state some central positive things we radical phil­
osophers favour, but it is also true that there are numerous things in our philos­
sophlcal environment we are reacting against and that our philosophical orienta­
tion is also defined by those things, tho.ugh it is important here to recognize that 
French, German or Italian radical philosophers would not be reacting against 
exactly the same thing. In the 'negative propositions' which follow it is impor­
tant to remember that they a.re strictures--skewed if you will--by conditions 
which are rather distinctive of the Anglo-American and Scandinavian philo· 
sophical communities (if that is the right word). 
Radical philosophers reject the following features in the dominant non-rad­
ical philosophy in their environment. 
11. We reject the belief, sometimes explicit and sometimes im­
plicit, that philosophy is a purely second-order discipline 
or activity such that it cannot have any substantive impli­
cations; most specifically we reject the claim that moral and 
social philosophy, if it is properly done, must be, should be 
or even can be neutral with respect to moral and practical 
issues. 
12.Non-radical philosophy has either wittingly or unwittingly 
failed to consider--or at least to consider at all adequately-­
questions about the ideological role of philosophy_ A myth 
of neutrality helps otiscure from such philosophers the ideo­
logical functions of their work. The very idea of examining 
89 
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90 
philosophical disputes in the light of non-philosophical ones 
is thought by most establishment philosophers to rest on a 
mistake. It is not a thing that a philosopher, if he under­
stands what he is doing, can legitimately do. That this is a 
mistake is challenged by radical philosophy. Philosophy, 
radical and non-radical has a social and ideological role and 
simply must be faced.20 
13. The scientism of most non-radical philosophy is an object 
of criticism; that is to say, such non-radical philosophies are 
uncritical and, therefore, defective in the dependent and 
passive attitudes they take towards scientific disciplines. 
Their relation to them is much like philosophy's relation to 
theology in the Middle .Ages. (Here the influence of the 
Frankfurt School is very evident.) 
14. Contemporary academic philosophy is "too little concerned 
with the social and political conditions of rationality, es­
pecially \Vith such conditions as may frustrate and inhibit 
the exercise and growth of rationality and knowledge. "2 1  
15. The dominant philosophical orientation in Anglo- American 
philosophy is criticized for its exclusiveness, its lack of in­
terest in work in other disciplines, particularly sociology, ec­
onomics and psychology and its narrowness of outlook with 
respect to alternative philosophical orientations. 
16.Establlshment philosophy is criticized for its professional· 
ism and academicism. By this is meant that philosophy is 
too much an esoteric pastime of a small clique of profes­
sionals, indifferent to and indeed often contemptuous of 
the need of the masses for a coherent and informed wotld­
view. Radical philosophy stresses the human necessity that 
people generally, and not just a few professionals, come to 
grips with philosophy in some reasonably extensive way. 
17.Contemporary Anglo-American philosophers typically work 
in a historical vacuum with scant socio-historical under­
standing, with little awareness of how they as philosophers 
are shaped and limited by their distinctive socio-historical 
context, and with none of the awareness called for by 
Hegel, Dewey, Collingwood and Lukacs of the need to dev­
elop categories and philosophical techniques for under­
standing and perspicuously displaying the historical develop­
ment of our thought.22 We see (for example) in the work of 
Hart and Warnock-exceUent as in it is in certain ways--an 
utterly ahilstorical appeal to human nature without any­
thing like an adequate consideration of questions about the 
extent to which these allegedly universal features are in 
reality products of historically and culturally contingent 
and variable circumstances. 2 3 
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v 
I shall not discuss a11 these theses much less discuss them in order. Rather, I 
shall take certain central ones that naturally cluster together and discuss them. I 
shall start by examining those claims which I believe most non-radical philoso­
phers would take to be most grossly unfair and/or rather thoroughly mistaken. 
Surely on or near to the top of the list would be our claims in propositions i• 9, 
10 and 12 about the ideological role of philosophy and particularly our claims 
about the ideological role of bourgeois philosophy. Indeed, the very phrase 
'bourgeois philosophy' will stick in the gullet, for non-radical philosophers will 
deny that what they do is 'bourgeois philosophy,' anymore than what their col­
leagues in the physics department do is 'bourgeois physics.' ('lhis is even com­
patible with their recognition of the appropriateness of the slogan the Heidelberg 
University students painted on the wall of their institute of applied physics, 
"Physik, die Prostituierte des Kapitals. ") They will resent such talk and regard 
it as grossly unfair because many of them can quite rightly point out that they 
are as disdainful and contemputous of the leadership and many of the values of 
the bourgeois order as we are and that they have no commitment to it. Many 
would add that they are also sceptical of our hopes for a 'socialist dawn' and the 
achievement of a classless society. Their expectation is that one pack of crooks 
and manipulators will replace another pack of crooks and manipulators, that new 
slogans will replace old slogans and that we will never get anything that looks 
like truth, reasonableness or humaneness. They deplore all this, but what they 
want to do is to get on with their philosophical work and this involves no com­
mitment on their part to any established order. They--depending on their partic­
ular philosophical interests-want'to understand what entailment is, whether con­
ceptions of identity are relative, wheth�r justice can be adequately characterized 
in terms of utility, whether rationality can be defined in basically Humean terms, 
whether (and if so in what way) attitudes essentially involve beliefs, whether we 
directly perceive sense data rather than physical objects, whether we can derive 
an ought from an is, and the like. These are difficult and perplexing conceptual 
questions and they, as philosophers, want to try as best they can to sort them 
out. In this sorting out or attempted sorting out they are not--so they believe­
committing themselves to any ideology, bourgeois or otherwise. They are just 
trying to do--sometimes in a systematic way and sometimes not--conceptual 
analysis. They are trying to get clear about and perspicuously display certain of 
our very central concepts. This is not, they will insist, ideology or ideological. 
Part of this reply seems to me reasonable enough. To be fair we need to ack­
nowledge it and make it perfectly plain that we are not denying this. The part, 
that is a thoroughly legitimate response on their part, has to do with much 
(though not all) of the content of their claims and, even more importantly, with 
the intentions of a vast number--probably the vast majority--of contemporary, 
very professionally oriented analytical or linguistic philosophers. These profes­
sionally oriented philosophers simply want to get on with their job of sorting 
out conceptual perplexities of the type I characterized above. They will natur­
ally resent that we give to understand that they are tools of, apologists for, or 
even servants of the bourgeois order. What we need to make perfectly plain is 
that it is not their good intentions that we are attacking, but the indirect effect 
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of their work. That, in a way I shall try to detail and justify, is on the whole 
ideological and indeed ideological in such a way that it serves and supports the 
bourgeois order. 
The very choice of problems that typically get discussed and are taken as the 
really serious and central proble� of philosophy and the stipulations (implicit 
or overt) about proper method in philosophy, are both such that they are not 
likely to lead the student or indeed the philosophy professor or philosopher 
himself to ask critical questions about his society and the quality of his life. 
Philosophers tend to concentrate on questions such as the nature of identity, 
personal identity, mind and body, causation and determinism, induction and 
probability, the relation of knowledge to be1ief, universals and reality, sensation, 
perception and the physical world, language, meaning and verification, God and 
immortality and the nature of moral judgments. Two extensively used and in 
their own way excellent standard analytically oriented anthologies, Paul 
Edwards' and Arthur Pap's, A Modem Introduction to Philosophy and Oswald 
Hanfling'� Fundamental Problems in Philosophy, center on just such problems. 
ln these anthologies there is an extensive discussion of our knowledge of other 
minds, our knowledge of the external works ! priori knowledge, the nature of 
the nature of the self and the problem of disembodied existence, and our know­
ledge (putative knowledge) of God, In the Pap and Edwards volume there is no 
discussion at all of political and social philosophy and in the Hanfling volume 
there is only a very thin section--thirty pages in a book of four hundred and 
eighteen pages--and there is no selection from Marx or any other radical thinker. 
These anthologies,are, I repeat, typical and widely used. They have the not in­
considerable virtue that if they are carefully read and carefully taught they will 
instill in students a sense of hard and careful argument. In that way they are in­
deed excellent. But hard and careful argument can be developed about many 
different topics and conceptual sensitivity can also be developed through an ex­
amination of a varied list of topics. 
The effect of the stress on the topics listed above is that students and indeed 
the professional philosophers themselves will not come to think hard and care­
fully and in a systematic way about topics with a pothetially explosive social 
content; that is they will not be led by anything in their philosophical work to 
take a careful critical look at their lives and their society. If, as Max Horkheimer 
contends, the "social function of philosophy lies in its criticism of what is pre­
valent," if it is--when it is a genuinely critical cndcavour--an ac tivity which works 
"to prevent mankind from losing itself in those ideas and activities which the ex­
isting .organization of society instills into its members," and if it is to function to 
help achieve an enhanced understanding of the rationale of the dominant social 
institutions, the rationality of the ruling ideas and the plausibility and justifiabil­
ity of these ideas, then there is very little in the standard work in philosophy 
which contributes toward this critical awareness.24 Philosophers pride them­
selves on the capacity of philosophy to enhance our critical powers and aware­
ness, but in the above very crucial ways such philosophy does not develop our 
critical awareness and potential; in fact it helps blunt it  by treating as really deep 
and significant--and thus concentrating on--precisely those problems which do 
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not give us any such understanding of our society and our condition. This is fur­
ther reinforced by giving to understand, as such philosophy sometimes does, 
that such social problems are really conceptual muddles or 'all ideology' and 
that no comprehensive and systematic understanding of them is possible. 
Moral philosophy, as it is usually practiced, is no exception to this. There 
is much discussion of 'the language of morals/ the logical behaviour of 'good' 
and 'ought,' whether 'good' is naturalistically definable, whether moral judg­
ments can rightly be said to be objective, and whether we can intuit moral truths 
or even properly speak of moral utterances as being either true or false. But there 
is very little actual systematic moral argument resulting in assessments of our 
institutions and our condition. Things that reflective people would really like to 
come to gJ:ips with in trying to make sense of their lives and in trying to µnder­
stand how they as agents are to live in their world are not faced. Students, and 
indeed the professor himself, do not come away with any directions or bearings 
here. Indeed, it is often claimed that such questions are not within the domain of 
philosophy and that they are indeed not questions to which any non-ideological 
(pejorative sense of 'ideological') answer can be given.25 Even where these .!. 
priori restrictions on the scope of philosophy are not insisted on, it still remains 
the case, even with the more permissive establishment approaches to philosophy, 
that we arc given to understand that we are not in the position, at present at 
least, to come to grips with these problems. They are too vast and multifaceted 
for us to be able to say anything significant about which would be professionally 
responsible. 
It is indeed true that we want to avoid, where we can, a premature assessment 
of large scale problems, but we must also remember that the multiplying of dis· 
tinctions may have no end--there is no obvious and natural place to stop--and to 
decide which distinctions are sufficiently important to be worth making will 
have to be assessed in terms of some conception of a larger significance. More­
over, even though these larger scale questions about society and the quality of 
our lives may be in certain respects distressingly vague, with very ill-defined 
boundaries, they are also questions with which, humanly speaking, we very much 
need tu come to grips. But a student coming to philosophy does not come to 
grips with them, and there is very little work coming from non-radical philoso­
phers on such questions. 
Where attention is turned to social problems--say abortion or civil disobed­
ience--it is almost invariably piecemeal work which makes no effort to set the 
problem. in a larger framework or to relate it systematically to a critique of 
society and to any attempt to conceptualize the direction in which society could 
change and should change. 
In failing to come to grips with such problems or even to raise them, estab­
lishment philosophy is in effect ideological. Philosophy and philosophers, and 
the students who study with them, remain--at least as far as their ph_ilosophical 
and intellectual activities go--passive before the status quo. St}ldents who take 
to philosophy are given an enhanced sensitivity to logical distinctions, a sensi­
tivity to the uses of language and shades of meaning, a better understanding of 
the logical status of their utterances, and a better grasp of what is being assumed 
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as distinct from what is being argued for and what, at least in some domains, con­
stitutes a proof. I do not want for a moment to suggest that this counts for no­
thing. It most certainly is a valuable set of skills and it would be a mistake of con­
siderable magnitude if these skills were to be lost in a radical tradition in phil­
osophy which I hope will finally come to existence in the English-speaking world 
as it has on the Continent. {I do not suggest that we at all follow such philoso­
phers as Adorno and Habermas in their penchant for obscurity.) But the acquir­
ing of these skllls must not be a 'be all or an end all' and it is important to see 
that these tools are not nearly sufficient to produce the critical awareness that 
would give us a critical theory of society in virtue of which we could achieve 
something of the social function of philosophy , viz. a criticism of what is preval­
ent, a systematic critique of society. 
Establishment philosophy is passive here or worse. (Worse when it sets up stip­
ulations about 'philosophy: which turns such a critique into a kind of irrational 
ideology and/or rules out the very possibility that such an endeavour could count 
as a philosophical one.) It is passive in that it simply does nothing with such pro­
blems, except in some instances engender a suspicion about their inteJ]ectual re­
spectability or suggest that they are outside the domain of philosophical analysis. 
An ancient and crucial dimension of philosophy is simply lost and few critical 
tools or methods are developed for examining society in this crucial way. In this 
way establishment philosophy is in effect ideological and indeed damagingly and 
conservatively ideological., for it, by its very practice, prevents or at least dis­
courages the raising of critical questions about society or the erecting of theories 
in virtue of which we can understand society and gain some understanding of how 
we can and should change society. 
Philosophers pride themselves in being critical spiritst but they in reality do 
not disturb the running of society or the ruling class at all, but dig for them­
selves a modest niche where they will not disturb anything in society--except 
perhaps religion (hopefully a dying element in our social life anyway)--or help 
provide the terms of social institutions, practices and the resultant condition of 
human beings. In that way, contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking 
world and in Scandinavia is ideological and indeed is conservatively ideological, 
i.e. it plays its part in keeping people passive and it helps con them into a contin­
ued acceptance of the status quo. 
VI 
This is not to say that philosophy should not investigate, and indeed carefully 
and exactly investigate, the concept of truth, ac; have Tarski, Strawson, Quine 
and Mackie, and the concept of rationality, as have Rawls, Richards, Brandt, 
and Gauthier. This work, we will be told, is indirectly improtant for a critical 
appraisaJ of society and is not ignored by establishment philosophers (indeed it 
is a staple in their diet), though the radical tradition has made little in the way of 
a contribution to it. 
There is justice in these remarks, but it is also important to recognize the kind 
of crucial questions about these key concepts that have been rather extensively 
ignored by establishment philosophers who have examined them. They have ig­
nored the social and political conditions of rationality, the way conceptions of 
rationality (ar; Habennas and Schroyer have stressed) are skewed by the techno· 
logical thrust of our society in the service of capitalist interests, and they have 
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not faced adequately questions arising about the social determination of truth. 
(Here the whole issue of truth and ideology looms large.) We are or should be 
interested in definitions of 'truth' and 'rationality' primarily in order to help us 
ascertain whether there are stable cross·cultural criteria in the different domains 
of thought for determining a) when beliefs are true and even when whole sys­
tems of belief are true and when they are false or so incoherent·or ill-conceived 
that they could not possibly be true and b) when it is rational or reasonable to 
believe or do something that what systems for organizing social life are the most 
rational. 
In answering such questions we need to face challenges about the social deter­
mination of truth, the effects of ideology on our conceptions and the way our 
our position in society and history can blinker us in ascertaining what to do or 
what it is rational to believe. There is indeed an abundance (perhaps an overabun­
dance) of tangled questions centering around the issue of conceptual relativism 
where philosophy and a host of other disciplines come together. But establish­
ment philosophy's isolationism, particularly from sociology, historical studies 
and anthropology, puts philosophers in a poor position to examine such ques­
tions in any very convincing fashion. 
In trying to use the conceptions of truth and rationality in social critique, it 
is important to be clear about these matters. But here analytic philosophers do 
not give us clarity but often only arrogant ignorance. Philosophers out of this 
tradition, as .Alastair Macintyre has observed, have, in analyzing concepts, ignored 
the historical and social sources of the expressions which are to be the focus of 
their attention. 26 Such a lack of historical sense has resulted in a failure to grasp 
certain important changes in meaning and has often led these philosophers to 
confer necessity on s.ome conceptual scheme when there are actual alternatives 
to it. Such a philosophical mistake, when unrecognized, gives to an allegedly 
purely neutral conceptual account an unwitting conservative ideological bias. 
Such philosophers sometimes confuse ideology with truth and this confusion 
enables them to persist in accepting putative truths about the nature of society, 
man, or morality as such as 'timeless truths,' when in reality what is involved are 
hi.storically conditioned ideological commitments. To avoid this we need to gain 
a much greater unqerstanding of social science and of historical techniques. And 
with such an understanding we need ourselves to forge new tools, perhaps in s�me 
sense dialectical ones, for understanding concepts and society diachronically as 
well as synchronically. Slrawson may be right in claiming that some concepts, 
important to philosophy, hardly have a history at all, but many do and without 
an understanding of their history, philosophers will often have a parochial sem­
antics and confuse (to take an important example) the moral point of view with 
the dominant class morality of a given time and place. Here again the effect of 
non-radical philosophy, with its deliberate cancelling out as irrelevant certain 
social considerations, is unwittingly conservatively ideological. 
What non-radical philosophers out of the analytical tradition fail to see, as 
Macintyre also points out, is the persistence among them of "certain uncriticized 
ideological concepts and values."27 They fail to see the ways--sometimes very 
indirect--in which philosophy arises out of and in tum justifies certain ways of 
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life and how philosophy, systematic and general, as it often is, is for that reason 
ultimately political and indeed ideological. (Macpherson 's work on Hobbes and 
Goldmann's work on Pascal show this in important historical instances.) We can 
usually only see this with any clarity for a complex and important thinker when 
we look backwards. In their insensitivity to such considerations, again and again, 
establishment philosophers will fail to see the ideological distortions in their 
views. 
VII 
Finally, vis-a-vis arguments about non-radical philosophy's social role as 
ideology, I want to examine some remarks of both Paul Nizan in his The Watch­
dogs: Philosophers and the Established Order and Sean Sayers. 28 (The remarks 
of Sean Sayers I shall concentrate on come from his perceptive discussion of 
Nizan's book.) 
Both Nizan and Sayers refuse �o stop with the statements of intention on the 
part of bourgeois philosophers. They want to bring out, from behind the mysti­
fication surrounding it, what Sayers calls the real nature--the actual function--of 
their activity. By this is meant the actual effect it has in society and its realistic 
social role in society. This is very different from the images these bourgeois 
philosophers have of themselves and it is in the desparity between these images of 
themselves and their actual function in society that we find the self-deception-­
the false consciousness of these philosophers. (We are not here in the conceptual 
bind that Winch shows anthropologists to be in in studying primitive societies, 
for we already have a participant's understanding of philosophy.) 
They see themselves as detached, indeed as ideologically neutral. They argue 
whether one can derive an ought from an is or whether Hume was roughly right 
about causation or personal identity and whether there is in Locke or in reality 
a coherent distil).ction between primary and secondary qualities. This is conce� 
tual analysis, it is detached and remote from the struggles and needs of the world. 
Depending on exactly how they conceive their of activity, philosophers will 
assert that qua philosophers they either cannot or typically do not and indeed 
need not be involved in the concrete political and social struggles around them. 
'Ibere neither can be nor need not be any such taking of sides in philosophy. 
Philosophy seeks to see all the sides of any issue and then, in a detached and 
neutral manner, to display perspicuously the logic of the situation. 
However, Nizan and Sayers argue, this self-image is a fal� image. Such phil­
osophers "fail to attend to the real conditions of social existence and thus tend to 
describe the world in idealized terms."29 Even in doing social and moral 
philosophy, such bourgeois philosophers tend, with their idealized picture of the 
world, to ignore "the needs, the alienation and the misery which are the real 
facts of oppression."30 Such an idealized picture of the world "has the effect 
of justifying the established order."This is not how the establishment philosopher 
sees his work, but these states of affairs are the direct effects of work which is 
ostensibly non-partisan. It may be genuinely non-ideological in intent, but in 
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reali.ty it is a prop to a conservative ideology. Keeping in mind that 'supreme 
function' means 'actual effective,role,' Nizan's bitter and indeed harsh remarks 
gain in credibility: 
...  the supreme function of bourgeois philosophy is to obscure 
the miseries of contemporary reality: the spiritual destitution 
of vast numbers of men ... and the increasingly intolerable des­
parity between what they could achieve and what little they 
actually accomplished. This philosophy conceals the true na­
ture of bourgeois rule ...  It mystifies the victims of the bour­
geois regime ... It heads them into culs-de-sac where their 
rebellious instincts ;will be extinguished. It is the faithful ser­
vant of that social class which is the cause .of all the degradation 
in the world today ... 31 
Nizan also contends (and Sayers follows him here) that bourgeois thought 
with its posture of neutrality is ideological in still another way. To be indifferent 
to social issues, not to take sides in this struggl� between the exploiters and the 
exploited, the oppressors and the oppressed, is ;.n reality to side with exploiters. 
Given the moral enormity of the way that capitalist ruling class orders and social 
world, there are only two sides to take, to be either with the exploiters and op­
pressors or against them. There is no ideologically neutral vantage point here. 
However, it might be responded that Nizan and Sayers overstate their cause. 
Not all the degradation is caused by the capitalists and 'indifferent' in the con­
text of their argument needs disambiguation. It need not mean 'satisfied' for 
because he believes no position can be shown to be sound or unsound here and 
yet he might not be at all satisfied with the capitalist order. Moreover, where the 
particular capitalist order was as brutal as the Nazi regime, peopJe might fail to 
take sides, as far as any active commitment is concerned, out of fear. It  is also 
the case· that there are some 'philosophers,' rather utterly isolated from any 
understanding of what is going on around them, who might simply fail to see 
the kind of oppression, exploitation and dehumanization caused by monopoly 
capitalism. They are effectively children about political matters and do not side 
with any order; they just want to do free logic or examine whether emotions are 
essentially intentional. We should deplore the fact that there are such fachidioten, 
that being a philosopher and being an intellectual can be so disassociated that 
this can happen, but we can hardly fairJy accuse such 'philosophers' of siding 
with the oppressor. More generally, we should not forget that there is no reason 
why philosophers should not, like others, be deeply influenced by the dominant 
ideological pressures in bourgeois societies which, as Habermas has shown, depo­
litize and privatize our lives, keeping us firmly in our own little cubby holes, do­
ing our own thing. There are other philosophers, less unworldly and not so polit­
ically naive, who, informed by the ideology of the cold war, see the U.S.S.R. and 
Stalin as the model for socialism and, seeing the ills flowing from such a social 
order, refuse to take sides in any political struggle . But this does not mean they 
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are indifferent to human misery but that they despair of any human political re­
solution of it. So they tend their garden, which in this case means going on doing 
philosophy in a manner which, from the point of view of their intentions, is 
utterly apolitical. 
However, Nizan and Sayers are quite correct in stressing that in effect it is not 
apolitical, for in the struggle between the working class and the ruling class, such 
a philosophical posture effectively makes philosophy into something which 
makes no social critique at all and does not help the working class, as its members 
come into educational institutions, to gain the critical understanding they need 
in their struggle to change society. Philosophy could function to help give them 
a critical conceptual framework to understand what was happening to them and 
around them. However, in actuality it does not, but rather turns them away from 
such concerns to other concerns which in effect serve to keep them passive. I do 
n�t suggest for a moment, what is surely false, that these philosophers direct 
them to such concerns in order to keep them passive, but all the same, this is 
a socially and ideologically important effect of their activity. In this very crucial 
way such utterly apolitical philosophers are in reality very political indeed� their 
honest intentions to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Nizan and Sayers also stress that the effects of such a philosophical posture 
are more extensive than it seems on a superficial view of the matter. 3 2  (Though 
here I think what they say applies more straightforwardly to France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain than to the English-speaking countries and Scandinavia.) To see 
what is involved, consider the following. Philosophers are indeed a miniscule 
group, typically concerned with arguing out certain conceptual matters among 
themselves and typically quite unconcerned about their effect (if any) on the 
world. How can their abstruse speculation have very harmful effects!? The answer 
fa: through a not inconsiderable trickle-down effect. We must not forget the tru­
isms that philosophers are in the Academy and that they teach students. Slowly 
their conceptions are assimilated--though it simplified, distorted forms--meshing 
with other pervasive ideological conceptions from other disciplines--until, worked 
over by other interest groups, they become part of the popular ideology of a 
culture. These philosophical conceptions in such bowdlerized forms become per­
vasive in the culture. An example would be the assimilation--often in very dif­
ferent terms--of a roughly positivist, non-cognitivist conception of the relation 
between facts and values, such that the claim is  that the social sciences must be 
conceived of--to be sciences at all--as normatively neutral and that there can be 
no moral or normative knowledge. In the popular culture this may come out in 
the foggy notions that 'Values are just matters of opinion ' and 'No one can argue 
about values.' In general in western societies, cultural backwaters aside, there is, 
at least in our relatively educated populations, a rather homogeneous empiricist 
and liberal-individualist view of the world, though often (particularly with reli­
gious people) it is not so labelled. This popular ideology is thus informed, in this 
trickle-down and assimilated way, by philosoplhical conceptions and thus in a 
significant way very abstruse philosophical theories are influential.in articulating, 
transmitting, holding and preserving the ideology of a culture. It is not just the 
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consequentless pastime of a coterie of intellectuals. 
VIII 
I have in the preceding sections attempted to establish that non-radical analyt­
ical philosophy, notwithstanding the good intentions of many of its practitioners, 
has a conservative ideological thrust. In doing this I have tried to come to grips 
with the issues raised in propositions 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17 stated in 
Section IV. I now want to consider issues raised by some of the other proposi­
tions, again starting with issues which will surely provoke sharp disagreement 
from many non-radical analytical philosophers. Indeed, we may in some in­
stances not even get to something as intellectual as disagreement; we may just 
get a flippant dismissive reaction. The remaining propositions most likely to pro­
duce such a reaction are .2, 3, 4, 5, 10 and 13 and other elements in 16 than 
those which have already been discussed. 
What most evidently will surely an n oy many philosophers deeply influenced 
by either Austin or Quine and indeed even seem to them to be outrageous is the 
claim of 5 and 10 that we should as philosophers articulate a consistent world· 
view and a body of guiding principles which will enable the masses--the working 
class (the vast majority of people)-·to make sense of their world and to give them 
something to live by. To this it wiII be responded (as Anthony Quinton and 
G.J. Warnock have) that this is to give philosophy a task which is not its own.33 
It is indeed to confuse philosophy with religion, ideology or Weltanschauung.34 
Philosophy is not a form of preaching or even advocacy but is an attempt to give 
a perspicuous representation of our fundamental concepts and to give us some 
reflective understanding of the nature of our moral and social world and the 
order of nature. Many non-radical philosophers would add, in agreement with 
to unearth and make evident the often unrecognized presuppositions which are 
at the basis of our conceptual schemes and to examine what grounds, i f  any, 
could be given for their continued acceptance; many would also acknowledge a 
legitimacy of attempting to gain a systematic view of reality and indeed most 
particularly of human reality. But they would balk at all talk of giving the masses 
or anyone else something to live by. 
This reaction is understandable and yet I believe that there is a reading of this 
radical claim in which such a claim can be seen to be perfectly appropriate and 
indeed indispensable in developing radical philosophy. 
I shall go at this indirectly by attending first to the related but less 'offensive' 
remarks contained in propositions 1 and 2. There the claim was that philosophy 
needs to be practiced in such a way that it is relevant to the lives of people. In 
that way it finds a rational human use. It can be re1evant to their needs through 
its emancipatory interest. That is to say, it can give people some understanding 
of their own lives. Philosophers can help them to understand the causes of 
their alienation, misery, frustration and the inchoate but deepseated sense many 
peop1e have that there is something insane and senseless about much of contem· 
porary life. And in doing this we shall give them an enhanced understanding of 
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how society works. 
To stop there could be a council of despair. However, part of this emancipa· 
tory interest will also be concerned not only with giving an anatomy of society 
but also with the giving of some understanding of the directions in which society 
can and should be changed and the dynamics of that change. Here we must not 
forg�t that philosophy can and should--as I stressed in earlier sections of this 
essay--in concert with the social sciences and psychology. Indeed, what I suspect 
should emerge from what has been called radical philosophy is something rather 
new which is perhaps best called critical theory, though it will have specialized 
stresses from people with backgrounds and interests characteristic of what are 
now distinct disciplines. 
So far we have given no grounds for the claim that we are advocating a ground­
less moralizing or preaching or anything whic·h is at best non-rational or is at 
worst irrational. Only if some kind of non-cognitivist or subjectivist account of 
the foundations of morality could be made out would there he any taint of such 
non-rational or irrational moralism in the above programme. 'The case against sub­
jectivism and non-cognitivism, I admit, is more difficult to make than most peo­
ple realize. I have tried in various places a) to meet such accounts of morality 
head-on and show that we have grounds for believing we can have some objec­
tive moral knowledge, and! b) to show that the only forms in whcih such non­
cognitivist or subjectivist accounts are even plausible are accounts which have no 
nihilistic human implications.35 I shall not try to rehearse these arguments here. 
Moreover, from within the non-radical analytical tradition itself, there has 
emerged recently three very important systematic works in moral philosophy 
which, to put it conservatively, undermine the persuasiveness of non-cognitivism 
of morality. The books I have in mind are Bernard Gert's Moral Rules. D.A.J. 
Richards' A Theory of Reas,ons for Action, and John Rawls' A Theory of Justice. 
Radical philo,sophers will want to criticize them in certain directions, but I 
think it is plain enough that these impressive books lay the ghost of an extreme 
ethical scepticism which would deny the very reality of any moral knowledge. 
Without the underpinning of noon-cognitivism and ethical scepticism, I do not 
see any grounds for claiming our programme with its emancipatory interests 
rests on groundless irrational or non-rational moralizing. We are not preaching 
or just moralizing or simply trying to get people to do things, but are doing 
what philosophers have traditionally been properly doing, namely elucidating, 
arguing and reasoning in a systematic way. Our arguments involve among other 
things normative arguments · but unless some form of non-cognitivism can be 
sustained, there is nothing illegitimate in that. 
Now, going back to propositions 5 and 10, I do not see why helping people 
make sense of their world or giving people something to live by need be under­
stood as anything more woolly than what I have characterized above. We need 
to start, as Nizan stresses, from a solid recognition that there is massive oppres­
sion, exploitation and gross injustice in the world and that there is a struggle go­
ing on between the oppressors and the oppressed . This must be understood in 
global terms for its full force to be felt. 'Ihere is, as he puts it, in the lives of 
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most of us, a "spiritual destitution�' and an "increasingly intolerable disparity" 
between what we could achieve and what little we actually achieve."36 These 
are concrete realities with which we start. Should they be questioned, we can 
show that they actually obtain. Proceeding to a more abstract level, we display 
what it is about our society that makes this so and indicate the grounds for be­
lieving that such a condition is not a necessary human condition rooted in 'the 
very nature of things.' We also, in very general terms, give some conception of a 
different and better vision of the future--a possible, not, I would argue, an inevit­
able future. 
In doing these things in a reasonably extensive and systematic way, a classifi­
catory and categorial conceptual system of a recognizably philosophical sort will 
need to be developed, clarified and its presuppositions unearthed and justified. 
Knowledge and understanding of a theoretical sort is, ·of course, vital here. 
However, this theorizing would still be rooted in a recognition of the primacy 
and centrality of the interests and needs of the vast masses of mankind. It would 
be theory in service of that social interest and that would be its underlying social 
intent or moral rationale. It would have as its most central end the achievement 
of a comprehensive overview of human life and society which would enable per­
sons to make sense of their lives and to achieve some vision of a better future 
for humankind. But this must be grounded in a concrete and detailed knowledge 
of the realities about us and a systematic understanding of man, nature, and the 
dynamics of society. We must in doing this have something which can be reasoned 
out and argued for at every step, though in a manner which is relevant to the par­
ticular types of things we are talking about. 
IX 
There are two criticisms of the argument of the last section which I would. now 
like to consider. The first would be natural to make from a radical perspective 
and the second would come natural to many a non-radical analytical philosopher, 
even one with left literal leanings. 
Let me consider the radical criticism first: It could plausibly be claimed that 
in the above argument some rather excessively elitist thinking is going on. In 
proposition 5 and in the above section , I spoke of giving the working class'some­
thing to live by' and 'giving them a consistent world-view and a body of guiding 
principles,' but who are we philosophers to be laying down the law, to be tell­
ing the rest of the working class how they should live? Do we think we are high 
priests or shamans? Our experience in the labour force is distinctly unusual and 
our class backgrounds are rather varied. Furthermore, it takes more than pure 
thought--even if such a thing ex.isted--to come to grips with live social problems. 
In forging new tablets, we need as well, and even more crucially, the varied ex­
periences of the working class in' their struggles with the ruling capitalist class. 
We need to have a good understanding of the working class both in its rather 
considerable variety and in its typicality; we need an understanding of its char­
acteristic experiences of work, leisure, family life and the like, The forging of 
new tablets should be a collective affair of the working class and it needs to be 
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rooted in a thorough understanding of working class life and working class 
struggles. New tablets are not to come from above as the promulgations of 
radical intellectual ubermenschen whose experience of life and understanding of 
the class struggle may be skewed by either or both a) their upper-class or petite 
bourgeois origins, on the one hand, or their unwitting identifications and 
attitudes, on the other, and b) by their rather unique and· sheltered work 
experiences. There can be no such identification of the interests of the working 
class with the interests of an typical elite within that class. 
I accept the thrust of this criticism and if the intent of proposition 5 is to 
deny what is said above, then I would argue that 5 is mistaken. The role of 
intellectuals--mcluding, of course, radical philosophers-should be like that of 
Marx and Engels. Given that our position in the labour force has afforded us 
very specialized work--work in which we can and indeed should, spend more 
time in study and reflection than most people can-we should use this expertise 
in bringing the fore, and setting in a distinct perspective, certain facts, 
implications, possible consequences of policies effecting the interests of the 
working class. but not likely to be known by our fellow workers. We further can 
and indeed should, in light of those facts and the like, set-out--though always in 
a provisional manner--an interpretive framework in accordance with which these 
facts, etc. should be viewed and classified. But what finally should be done in 
the light of these facts , implications, theories, and the like should be decided 
democratically by the working class. There is no need for 'moral experts' or 
elitists here and indeed that there must be such elites or 'experts' is a plain 
implication of our conception of a worker's democracy. 
Non-radical analy tical philosophers-even some with left-leaning political 
tendencies--will find it natural to object to the case I made in the previous 
section and to the central claims made in 10 and 16.  It will be argued that really 
serious philosophy, like serious physics, economics, musicology or brain surgery, 
is just too specialized and demanding to make any headway with unless one is 
either a genius or a man of nonnal intelligence but with years of specialized 
training. With the taking of several good philosophy courses of a relaviely 
introductory sort, some people can come to have clearer heads about some 
matters ·of vital interest to them and it might even be possible, if philosophy 
were taught more in the manner we radicals would have it taught, that people 
would gain a keener understanding of their society and the options open to 
them . They might even come in time to have a more adequate comprehensive 
picture of the world. All this could be true, while it still remains the case that 
the really deep and controversial elements in this philosophical overview, as the 
comparable elements in physics or economics, would remain almqst articles of 
faith for the working class or indeed for anyone other than the specialist in this 
domain. It is not necessarily even a matter of intelligence of conceptual 
acuteness of special aptitudes (whatever, if anything, these things may signify), 
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but it may simply be due to certain contingently developed interests and a very 
intensive specialization that results from the division of labour such that if this 
division of labour ceases to exist, we will ·no longer have people who can do what 
Wiggins and Shoemaker have done on identify or Putnam and Geach on 
reference or Ziff and Chomsky about semantics or Kripke and Lewis about 
necessity or Quine or Wittgenstein on conceptual foundations or Rawls and 
Baier on the foundations of morality. These matters require specilization and 
indeed the very opposite of the commitment to amateurishness with which some 
radical philosophers have taxed linguistic phil osophers. 
People can get useful and systematic popularizations of such notions put 
together in such a way as to set forth in fairly straightforward terms a reasonable 
and reasonably unified view of the world. These popularizations will in turn be 
useful in the dev.elopment by the working class, with the aid of philosophers 
with solid working class identifications, of a world-view which will serve as a 
basis for a critique and a more intelligent understanding of society. But there can 
be in general no getting to the bottom of these technical philosophical issues by 
the masses, not because the masses generally lack the requisite intelligence, but 
because such a philosophical understanding, like the playing of Rostropovich or 
the performing of delicate brain or heart surgery, is the product of a long 
training and specialization. To think it could or should be otherwise is to 
confuse philosophy with ideology or Weltanschauung. 
Again I am in sympathy with much of this. When we desire it to be the case 
that the masses will come to grips with philosophy in some reasonably extensive 
way, we surely cannot reasonably mean that they should be able to gain the kind 
of knowledge which will push back the frontiers of the subject. In gaining--as 
typical members of a class-conscious working class-a coherent and informed 
world view, we cannot sensibly mean that such members (members picked at 
random) must be able to make original contributions to a theory (account) of 
reference or to a theory (account) of rationality. It should be admitted that 
whatever reasonable transformation of philosophy there may be in the direction 
of a comprehensive critical theory of society , there will remain elements of that 
account which, for a fullness of understanding, will require specialists. 
However, the other side of the coin is that, if philosophy moved more 
decisively in the direction of the comprehensive social critique (critical theory of 
society) that we radicals seek, many of the perplexities that have exercised 
Wiggins and Shoemaker, for example, or Ziff and Chomsky, might be seen to be 
just specialists' puzzles with a rather limited general philosophical interest. (This, 
of course, does not render them worthless or pointless, though they then on our 
conception, would not be a part of the corpus of problems which are the 
fundamental problems of philosophy.) But-particularly with Chomsky's 
work--this is far from certain; that is to say, with some of this work it is not 
evident that it does not have, at least by implication, a more general 
philosophical interest. And the radically different endeavours of Kripke and 
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Lewis, Rawls and Baier, Quine and Wittgenstein--all requmng a specialist's 
training for a through understanding and appaisal and at least some of which are 
of general philosophical interest--are not matters that we can expect the masses, 
no matter how good their education, to, in one very important sense, appraise. 
However, 'appraise' needs disambiguation here. If it is taken to mean 'to 
ascertain the logical cogency and adequacy of,' then the answer is 'No, of course 
they .could not do so,' bl!lt if, alternatively, 'appraise' is taken to mean 'to 
ascertain the value of these conceptions in enabling people to make sense of 
their lives and society and to engage in social critique and assessment with the 
end in view of achieving social change,' then the answer is 'Perhaps they could be 
in a position to do so, provided that they have in some reasonable manner been 
in an extended dialogue over these issues with those philosophers who are 
thoroughly equipped to examine the technical philosophicalissues in question.' 
(Here some reasonable accurate popularizations are in order). I make this 
comment with considerable ambivalence for even this kind of understanding 
makes incredible demands on people, given the complexity of our civilization. 
Moreover, the recognition that these may be excessive demands does not commit 
one to what Horkheimer and Habermas have chastized as scientism. Some think 
that I am being far too utopian here and that realism about human possibilities 
would never allow us to even hope this. I share these worries but refuse, before 
we are in a position to give such a 'utopian conception' a try, to so lower my 
sights about our educatability. 
The difficulties are compounded by the following considerations. I do not 
mean to suggest th3t these two kinds of appraisal can be kept completely apart. 
The remark in the above paragraph needs qualification to the effect that such 
plain men must have som:_ understanding to the relative merits of the opposing 
philosophical arguments to be able to carry out the second type of appraisal. I 
am not claiming that statistically normal members of the working class can 
resolve questions about the soundness of certain key arguments concerning some 
of these very technical philosophical issuesrbut I am claiming that,where the second 
conception of appraisal is at issue, there--at least in many cases-can be no 
rational resolution of the issues concerning this philosophical issue, raised by this 
second conception of appraisal, without some consideration of the logical 
cogency of the arguments over the philosophical issue at hand. In fine, the latter 
sort of appraisal requires something of the former. But the qualifiers 'some� and 
'something' are very important here; the requirement is not, absurdly, that such 
normal members of the working class must have a thorough understanding of 
what is involved in the first appraisive activity in order to make the second kind 
of appraisal, but that they have some reasonable understanding of the 
arguments. 'Re�onable' in ·such a context is, of course, vague and I see no way 
of making the matter more precise. And I remain worried about its vagueness. 
Yet I am not convinced that this is a stultifying vag_ueness for in particular cases-
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and this is where the actual crunch will come--experienced and reflective people 
can decide what counts as a 'reasonable understanding.' (Note, we can usually 
tell in conversation when students have understood a philosophical argument.) 
There is a further relevant point here. It should be noted that while these 
technical philosophical issues are indeed abstruse, difficult and often intractable, 
there is no sufficient reason to deny, where competent proponents of opposing 
viewpoints concerning these issues (say , arguments about the nature of necessity, 
individuation or reference) put their central and opposing claims in rather plain 
terms and with reference to issues bearing on the problems of human beings, 
that soberly educated and reflective non-specalists can gain some understanding 
of their respective logical merits, particularly at those junctures, if any, where 
the technical philosophical claims touch on their interests. 
If someone persists in saying that the average plain main just could not know 
enou�, then the person making that claim should be reminded of the fact that 
work in philosophy and economic theory which taxed many of the most 
powerful and creative minds thirty years ago is now mastered routinely by an 
competent graduate student in the relevant discipline. There is no good reason 
not believing that some reasonably accurate and perceptive 'popularization' of 
what these students mastered could not and would not be mastered by people of 
normal intelligence when it was in their interest to do so. 
It is, of course, the case that creative discovery is one thing and subsequent 
mastery is another. But there. is nothing in a radical (including a Marxist) 
conception of the world which denies that there will be individuals of creative 
genius who will forge new conceptions and theories. Rather the claim is that, 
after their discovery and articulation, there is no sound reason why important 
and difficult conceptual matters, with a bearing on the articulation of an 
adequate comprehensive critical theory of society, could not be stated in such a 
way that they could be understood and their merits or lack thereof appreciated 
by people of normal intelligence who have been reasonably well educated . There 
is no adequate reason to believe that there is something here which is plainly or 
even not so plainly beyond the capacity of normal members of the working class 
to appraise. 
Given the conception of philosophy I have been most centrally concerned to 
elucidate and defend-namely, philosophy as centrally a comprehensive critical 
theory of society--what is even more crucial to realize is that many of the issues 
most baffling to analytical philosophers will be seen to be nit-picking puzzles 
with very little bearing on a comprehensive critical theory of society . The 
resolution of these puzzles may require very decidedly a specialist's knowledge, 
but we need neither to be able to resolve nor dissolve these puzzles in order to 
solve problems of key importance concerning a critical theo ry of society. But 
this is what, from the point of view of radical philosophy ' it is crucial to solve 
and here we have no good reason to believe that we have something which is 
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beyond the appreciation of plain persons in possession of a reasonable 
education. 
x 
The whole thrust of what I have been arguing makes it evident how integrally 
linked radical philosophy must be with the struggle to achieve a socialist 
transformation of society, though this should not be taken for a moment to 
imply or suggest that a radical philosopher must not be prepared to consider in 
all seriousness questions and challenges concerning the justification of socialism 
and the justification for taking in the struggle for social change, the 
revolutionary road. He must start from and return to-though in between he may 
stray far afield--the problems of the masses in their practical activity and 
struggles. The problems of human bein�, in sum, must become the problems of 
philosophers. In this way philosophical theory interctcts with practice, both 
being informed by it and in tum informing it. (I do not deny for a moment that 
much more needs to be said here about theory and practice and in a much 
clearer manner.) It is essential, if good work is to be done in philosophy, 
conceived as a critical theory of society, that we attend carefully and without 
mystification to the real conditions of social existence. This, however, is never a 
purely armchair affair only requiring 'pure thought' or conceptual analysis. 
Critical theory will, of course, involve theory construction and conceptual 
analysis, but it will also involve an actual empirical study of society. To carry 
out our programmatic tasks we cannot accept the arbitrary disciplinary 
restrictions that most analytical philosophers and indeed most traditional 
philosophers as well impose themselves. Here we are in approach to Marx and to 
the pragmatists. 
We must be clear that our intellectual work is to be a critical weapon in the 
class struggle. We must, of course, take care 'to te�l it like it is,' to not tell lies to 
ourselves, let alone to anyone else, or engage in mystification or myth-making, 
including of course self-mystification. And this latter is, of course, easier said 
than done. Indeed, in the more controversial portions of this essay I may have 
engaged unwittingly in some self-mystification myself. This struggle for 
understanding is an endless one where we can only attain partial victories. But be 
that as it may' we must not forget that our knowledge and understanding is not 
something which simply has a value for its own sake--though it may have this 
value as well-but is instrumentally valuable in helping the working class to attain 
class-consciousness with its attendant understanding and weapons of criticism-a 
consciousness which in turn will enable them (given certain conditions) at long 
last to being an end to capitalist domination and exploitation. And this means 
that it will enable the working class to bring to an end the whole capitalist 
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system , for there is no capitalism without domination and exploitation. We must 
never for a moment forget that this is the contextual background against which 
our radical philosophizing operates. We reason and act in the light of this 
background and it provides radical philosophy with its ultimate rationale. 
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